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 Identifying and Rewarding Subcrowds in Crowdsourcing
Siyuan Liu and Xiuyi Fan and Chunyan Miao1
Abstract. Identifying and rewarding truthful workers are key to the
sustainability of crowdsourcing platforms. In this paper, we present
a clustering based rewarding mechanism that rewards workers based
on their truthfulness while accommodating the differences in work-
ers’ preferences. Experimental results show that the proposed ap-
proach can effectively discover subcrowds under various conditions,
and truthful workers are better rewarded than less truthful ones.
1 INTRODUCTION
Identifying and rewarding truthful workers are key to the sustain-
ability of crowdsourcing platforms. However, in consensus tasks [1],
workers may have an unknown number of different trustful answers.
To accommodate this, we propose a partitional clustering technique
to identify and reward subcrowds, a group of workers having similar
preferences and giving similar answers to the consensus tasks. Unlike
many other clustering algorithms which require the prior knowledge
of the number of clusters, our approach estimates the number of clus-
ters. Thus, we assign each worker to a single cluster and reward the
worker based on the distance from his/her answers to the cluster cen-
ter. Experimental results show that the proposed clustering approach
is able to identify subcrowds even with a signiﬁcant amount of the
population being untruthful. Results also show that the workers will
receive more rewards if they provide more truthful answers.
2 IDENTIFYING AND REWARDING
SUBCROWDS
Suppose a crowdsourced consensus task is composed ofN questions.
The answers from a worker w for theseN questions is a vector/point
vw = [a
1
w, a
2
w, . . . , a
N
w ] in an N dimension space. Thus, our goal is
to classify these answer vectors into clusters.
Since the number of subcrowds is unknown, we need to ﬁrstly de-
velop a clustering algorithm that estimates the number of clusters as
well as partitioning the space into clusters. The developed algorithm
is shown in Algorithm 1. We ﬁrst randomly select a small subset V ′
from the set of collected answer vectors V as observation points in
Line 1. Then for each vector v′ in the subset, we calculate the dis-
tance between v′ and any other vector v in V to create the distance
histogram hist in Line 5. We use the discrete metric and the L2 norm
to measure distances for discrete and continuous answers, as given in
Equation 1 and Equation 2, respectively.
dist(x, y) = |{(xi, yi)|xi = yi, i = 1, 2, . . . , N}|. (1)
dist(x, y) = (
N∑
i=1
|xi − yi|2) 12 . (2)
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Procedure: FindCenter(V )
Input : V , collected answer vectors;
Output : C, a set of initial centers;
Randomly select observation points V ′ ⊂ V ;1
C = ∅; hist = ∅;2
foreach v′ ∈ V ′ do3
foreach v ∈ V do4
hist[dist(v, v′)]+ = 1;5
foreach d ∈ hist do6
if d is a local maximum in hist then7
Cd = {v ∈ V |dist(v′, v) == d};8
C = C ∪mean(Cd);9
return C as initial centers.10
Algorithm 1: Initial center estimation.
In Lines 6 and 7, we identify all local maxima in the histogram, as a
local maximum indicates a dense area. In Lines 8 and 9, we identify
all points in a dense area and set an initial center to be the center of
this area. After we repeat the procedure for all the vectors in V ′, the
cumulated set of initial centers are returned as C. Then we assign all
points to their nearest centers in C to form clusters and move to the
procedure of merging them, as follows.
For each cluster, s, with center cs, we ﬁrst ﬁnd its radius rs, de-
ﬁned as the distance from cs to the farthest point in s. Then, for every
two clusters s and s′, if the distance between the two centers cs and
cs′ are smaller than their radius, s and s′ are then merged to form
sm. When there are no clusters to be merged, S will be returned as
the resulting clusters.
After clustering, we reward each worker based on its distance to
its nearest cluster center. Namely, given a worker with answer vector
v, let cv be the cluster center that is closest to v, then the rewarding
function R is:
R(v) = 1− dist(v, cv)
N
. (3)
The rewarding algorithm is based on the assumption that the distance
dist(v, cv) increases as a worker’s untruthfulness increases, which
we believe is reasonable when the subcrowds share the same truthful
answers and the workers behave consistently (within the subcrowd)
upon providing answers for all the questions.
3 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We use a discrete crowdsourcing dataset derived from [3] collected
from Baidu Test to conduct experiments. Each test in the dataset is
composed of 100 questions. Each question in the test contains 4 im-
ages and the task is to select the clearest one. The truthful answers
can be classiﬁed into K types, where K is an integer in the range of
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(a) p = 0.1 (b) p = 0.2 (c) p = 0.3 (d) p = 0.4 (e) p = 0.5
Figure 2. Comparison with the side-payment approach. CR is the proposed clustering reward; SP is the side-payment reward. p = 0.1, . . . , 0.5 are
population untruthfulness.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 1. (a) Average precision for proposed approach; (b) Average
precision for k-means; (c) Average recall for proposed approach; (d)
Average recall for k-means
[2, 20]. For each type, we simulate 100 workers with untruthfulness
p in {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9} meaning that a worker has p chance to ran-
domly select its answer2. Effectively, the dataset containing samples
forming 2 − 20 clusters with each cluster containing 100 vectors.
The spread of a cluster is controlled by the untruthfulness p, e.g.,
for p = 0.3, for every answer that is in the sample, there is 30%
chance that it is randomly selected. Each simulation is run 60 times
and average results are presented.
We study the clustering accuracy (i.e., the accuracy in identifying
subcrowds) using precision and recall3. To put our results into con-
text, we compare our approach with the classic k-means with known
k. Note that this gives k-means a strong edge as unlike feeding the
correct k into k-means, our approach also estimates the number of
clusters. Figure 1 presents the average precisions and recalls with
worker untruthfulness in the range of [0.1, 0.5].
As Figure 1 shows, the proposed approach achieves a higher preci-
sion result but lower recall result than k-means when the population
untruthfulness is not greater than 0.5, suggesting that the proposed
approach can achieve a high true positive. The recall increases with
the number of ground truth clusters, suggesting that false negative
2 It is known that untruthful workers will mostly select random answers [4].
3 Precision is deﬁned as True Positive / (True Positive + False Positive);
recall is deﬁned as True Positive / (True Positive + False Negative).
becomes smaller when there are more underlying clusters.
With the proposed clustering algorithm presenting promising re-
sults, we experiment its application on rewarding workers. We reused
the dataset described before with 15 clusters and an additional work-
er changing his untruthfulness ap from 0.1 to 0.5 to study the reward
achieved by the worker with different untruthfulness in various pop-
ulation truthfulness environments. Figure 2 plots the normalized re-
ward result for the additional worker when the untruthfulness of the
population also changes from 0.1 to 0.5.
In these ﬁgures, the x-axis is the worker’s untruthfulness, and the
y-axis is the normalized reward. We compare our results with the
side-payment (SP) incentive mechanism [2]. SP rewards workers by
comparing two randomly selected workers. Both workers are reward-
ed if their answers are identical; otherwise no worker is rewarded.
From Figure 2, we can see that with our clustering based approach
(i.e., CR), the worker with lower untruthfulness receives more re-
ward, regardless how (un-)truthful the entire population is.
4 CONCLUSION
Developing mechanisms to promote worker truthfulness is a key
problem in crowdsourcing. In this paper, we present a clustering
based approach to identify subcrowds and reward workers based on
the clustering result. The approach has the following advantages: (1)
it identiﬁes subcrowds even when there exist a large amount of un-
truthful answers, and (2) it rewards more to workers providing more
truthful answers. In the future, we will continue improving the clus-
tering techniques and conducting a more realistic testing.
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